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Teidel v. Northwestern Michigan College
In Teidel v. Northwestern Michigan College, 865 F.2d 88 (6th Cir.
1988), the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals held that a district court may
not enforce its pretrial mediation plan by forcing the losing party to pay
the prevailing party's actual attorneys' fees pursuant solely to a local
district rule.
This case was originally filed as a product liability action arising from
the crash of a private airplane. The plaintiff was a student in the defend-
ant university's flight program. The -rash of the airplane resulted in the
instructor's death and serious injury to the plaintiff. The case was filed in
the District Court for the Western District of Michigan, which submit-
ted the matter to mediation pursuant to Local Rule 42. The hour-long
mediation hearing consisted of a thirty minute presentation by both
sides, after which the panel rendered a unanimous "no cause" of action
in favor of the defendant. The plaintiff continued to insist upon a jury
trial and a jury ultimately returned a verdict for the defendant also. Af-
ter the trial, the defendant submitted a bill for, among other things, its
attorneys' fees and asked that it be levied against the plaintiff pursuant
to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d), 28 U.S.C. 1920 and Local
Rule 42. The district court held a hearing on this Motion and ruled in
favor of the defendant, prompting the plaintiff to appeal.
• The Sixth Circuit held that while 28 U.S.C. 2071 empowers the Su-
preme Court and all courts established by Congress tq prescribe rules for
conducting their business, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 83 requires
that district court rules be consistent with the federal scheme. The court
then focused on the case of Alyeska Pipe Line Service, Co. v. Wilderness
Society, 421 U.S. 240 (1975). Alyeska Pipe Line stated that the general
rule in federal courts, called the "American rule," is 1hat absent express
statutory language or an enforceable contract, litigants pay their own
attorney's fees. The Supreme Court therefore, held that federal courts
are not free to fashion new rules and remedies regarding attorneys' fees,
and, in the absence of a few limited exceptions, federal courts may not
award attorneys' fees. The Sixth Circuit in Teidel held that, as seen in
this light, a local rule which purports to authorize a district court to
award attorneys' fees as part of a pretrial mediation scheme is contrary
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to the federal scheme as interpreted by the Supreme Court in Alyeska
Pipe Line and reversed the previous award.
John W. Hopper
Barnett v. Sea Land Service, Inc.
In Barnett v. Sea Land Service, Inc., 875 F.2d 741 (9th Cir. 1989),
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that a district court can prop-
erly exclude a mediator's testimony about settlement when no written
settlement agreement exists.
The case arose when James Barnett was injured while employed on
board defendant Sea Land Services' vessel. After Barnett sued Sea Land
Service in federal court, the district judge assigned the lawsuit to media-
tion pursuant to Western District of Washington Local Rule 39.1. Al-
though no settlement was signed, the defendant believed that a settle-
ment had been reached during mediation. The plaintiff argued that no
settlement had been reached. At trial the defendant wanted to introduce
testimony from the mediator that a settlement had occurred. The trial
judge excluded the testimony on the ground that the local rule required
mediation settlements to be in writing.
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district courts' interpreta-
tion of the local rule and held that the district court properly barred
evidence regarding the mediation proceedings. The court analyzed the
local rule which provides:
Proceedings Privileged. All proceedings of the mediation conference, includ-
ing any statement made by any party, attorney or other participant, shall,
in all respects, be privileged and not reported, recorded, placed in evidence,
made known to the trial court or jury, or construed for any purpose as an
admission against interest: No party shall be bound by anything done or
said at the conference unless a settlement is reached, in which event the
agreement upon a settlement shall be reduced to writing and shall be bind-
ing upon all parties to that agreement.
Id. at 743-44.(emphasis added)
The court agreed with the plaintiff's argument that "since no written
settlement was consummated, none exists" under the local rule. Id. at
744. By holding that a settlement in mediation is not binding until re-
duced to writing, the court excluded evidence of the existence of an oral
settlement.
This case highlights the importance of reducing a mediation agree-
ment to a writing so that such settlements may be admitted in any future
court proceedings.
Julie Ellen Squire
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Delmay v. Paine Webber
The case of Delmay v. Paine Webber, 872 F.2d 356 (1 lth Cir. 1989)
involved a breach of contract by a customer (Delmay) against a securi-
ties broker (Paine Webber) in the Northern District Court of Georgia.
The broker requested a stay of the action in favor of arbitration. The
district court denied the request and found for the consumer. The broker
appealed, but the 11 th Circuit dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdic-
tion. The broker then filed a petition for reconsideration, which the 11 th
Circuit granted.
The central issue in the case is whether an Act of Congress can be
applied retrospectively to a pending case. The Judicial Improvements
and Access to Justice Act ("the Act") was enacted on November 19,
1988, while the case was pending. The Act permits an appeal to be taken
"from an order refusing a stay of any action under section 3 of this ti-
tle." The llth Circuit's previous ruling denied the broker's request to
stay judicial proceedings under section 3 of the Act. The broker argued
that becuase the case was pending when the Act was signed into law, the
11 th Circuit should vacate its prior ruling, retrospectively apply the Act,
and grant a rehearing on its appeal. Delmay countered that any retro-
spective application of the Act would compel her [into a situation in
which she would be forced to arbitrate.]
In making its decision, the 11 th Circuit concentrated heavily on the
general concerns of improving judicial efficiency by using alternative
forms of dispute resolution. The court stated that "the jurisdictional is-
sue implicates broad national concerns in the proper functioning of the
judicial process and in the pursuit of alternative dispute resolution tech-
niques." The court also pointed out that the section of the Act in ques-
tion does not force anyone into arbitration, unless the parties previously
agreed to arbitrate. The court mentioned that any retrospective applica-
tion may affect the procedure of the case as to timing, but no substantive
right to a jury trial would be affected. The court also emphasized the
legislative history in passing the Act. A House Report indicated that the
purpose of the Act was to facilitate arbitration by allowing interlocutory
appeal to a federal appellate court when the trial court denied that the
dispute could be resolved through arbitration, even though the trial court
found an arbitration agreement to exist. In passing the Act, Congress
was responding to the needs of the Judicial system by emphasizing the
importance of alternative forms of dispute resolution. The court also re-
marked that Congress' intent was curative in nature and acknowledged
that courts generally permit retrospective application of curative
statutes.
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The 11 th Circuit held that the newly enacted legislation should be ret-
rospectively applied to the case at hand. The Court reinstated the bro-
ker's appeal and vacated its prior decision.
Dimitrios S. Pousoulides
Block v. T.G. & Y. Stores
In Block v. T. G. & Y. Stores, No. 87-0490-CV-W-9 (W.D. Mo. Feb.
22, 1989), the United States District Court for the Western District of
Missouri held that a court can enter judgment upon an arbitrator's
award against a party who fails to participate meaningfully in the arbi-
tration process.
The case was originally assigned to compulsory, nonbinding arbitra-
tion under Local Rule 30. During prehearing discovery, defendant Mc-
Crory Corp. partially responded to Block's discovery requests and failed
to file a number of prehearing documents. At the hearing, McCrory's
attorney made no presentation to the arbitrators, ostensibly as a self-
imposed sanction for his client's failure to respond to Block's discovery
requests. The arbitrators awarded Block almost $184,600, plus interest,
against McCrory Corp. and McCrory filed a demand for trial de novo.
In a decision clearly upholding the goals of the local arbitration pro-
gram, the court struck McCrory's demand for trial de novo and entered
judgment against McCrory for the amount of the arbitration award. The
court quoted with approval the local rule providing for entry of judgment
based on the arbitrator's award as a sanction for not meaningfully par-
ticipating in the arbitration process and noted that
[w]ithout an enforceable requirement that litigants participate meaning-
fully in the arbitration process, the goals of the arbitration program are
threatened. If litigants could do as McCrory did here and escape a sanction,
the arbitrators would not be deciding contested issues. Essentially, arbitra-
tion would be a default proceeding, a meaningless proceeding prepatpry to a
district court trial. Without meaningful participation by all litigapts, the
arbitrators' award would have no credibility as an objective resolution of
disputed issues and the parties would not be encouraged to resolye their
disputes based on what is revealed about the strengths and weaknesses of
their positions.
This decision indicates that courts will enforce local rules permitting
rather heavy sanctions against parties who do not take the arbitration
process seriously, despite the nonbinding nature of the arbitration.
David S. Bence
Lawrence v. Walzer & Gabrielson
In Lawrence v. Walzer & Gabrielson, 256 Cal. Rptr. 6 (Cal.App. 2
Dist. 1989), the California Court of Appeal for the Second District held
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that a provision in an attorney retainer agreement by which the client
agreed to arbitrate any dispute "regarding fees, costs or any other aspect
of our attorney-client relationship" did not sufficiently apprise the client
that any legal malpractice claim would be required to be arbitrated, and
thus the client was not bound to arbitrate her legal malpractice claim.
Plaintiff retained defendant attorneys to represent her in the dissolu-
tion of her marriage. Plaintiff signed a three-page retainer agreement
consisting of thirteen paragraphs, nine of which dealt with financial mat-
ters. Paragraph 11 stated, "In the event of a dispute between us regard-
ing fees, costs or any other aspect of our attorney-client relationship, the
dispute shall be resolved by binding arbitration." This agreement was
not the product of negotiation.
Plaintiff subsequently filed a complaint against defendants alleging le-
gal malpractice 'and willful breach of fiduciary duty. Defendants then
filed a petition to compel arbitration of plaintiff's claims. Plaintiff ob-
jected, stating that she did not understand that by signing the retainer
she was agreeing to submit any future malpractice claims to arbitration.
The trial court believed plaintiff's contention and denied the petition to
compel arbitration.
In affirming the trial court's order, the court of appeal first noted that
there is no policy compelling persons to accept arbitration of controver-
sies which they have not agreed to arbitrate. The cqurt than examined
the arbitration clause in the retainer agreement and fojund that the plain-
tiff had not agreed to binding arbitration of either of her two claims.
The court rejected defendants' argument that the phrase "any other
aspect of our attorney-client relationship" in the arbitration clause com-
pelled arbitration of a malpractice claim. The court applied the rule of
construction known as ejusdem generis, which states that where general
words follow-the enumeration of particular classes of persons or things,
the general words will be construed as applicable to only persons or
things of the same general nature or class as those enumerated. Because
in this case the phrase "any other aspect of our attorney-client relation-
ship" preceded examples of disputes regarding fees and costs, the rule
mandated that the phrase applied only to disputes over financial matters
similar to fees and costs. Thus, plaintiff's malpractice and breach of fi-
duciary duty claims were not covered by the arbitration clause and plain-
tiff could not be compelled to arbitrate.
This case demonstrates that courts will scrutinize arbitration agree-
ments between attorneys and their clients very closely. It shows that a
party wishing to bind another to an agreement to arbitrate future dis-
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putes, such as malpractice claims, must take care to word the agreement
to specifically provide which types of disputes are to be arbitrated.
Melissa Stull
